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3 



AN OUTLINE 



OF THE 



HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
OF THE GREAT WAR 



Prepared for the Committee 

in Charge of the Course in War Issues 

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

by 

LAURENCE M. LARSON 



PRICE TWENTY-FIVE CENTS 



PUBLISHED BY THE 
UNIVERSITY OF ILUNOIS PRESS 
URBANA 1 



AN OUTLINE 

OF THE 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
OF THE GREAT WAR 



% ^■|(»' 



Prepared for the Committee 

in Charge of the Course in War Issues 

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF IfcLINOIS 



by 

lAURENCE M. LARSON 

Professor of Histor}^ 



PRICE TWENTi'-FIVE CENTS 



^'^ 






'^. of D, 

'. N 18 1919 



v'<4' 



PREFACE 

Purpose.— By direction of the War Department, the University of Illi- 
uois is giving this year a Course on the Issues of the War for members of the 
Student Army Training Corps. The purpose of this course is to give the 
citizen soldier an Intelligent appreciation of the importance for civilization 
of the great conflict in which he is called to take his part. This purpose 
can not be accomplished merely by listening to eloquent speeches; it re- 
quires serious study. With this end in view, the Instruction has been or- 
ganized as follows: 

War Issues I.— The first quarter will be mainly devoted to the historical 
background of the war, with due attention to geographic and economic, as 
well as political factors; the reasons for iVmerican participation will be 
studied in the President's addresses and elsewhere. In the second and third 
quarters, the ideals of the belligerent nations will be studied In their gov- 
ernments, their philosophies, and their literatures. This outline covers the 
work of the first quarter only. 

Each student will attend one lecture a week and two section meetings 
for discussion, as indicated in the Time Table published by the Registrar's 
Office. The section meetings will be devoted to oral discussion and written 
work. In these discussions, which will be based partly on the lectures and 
partly on required reading, students are encouraged to ask questions freely 
and every efi'ort will be made to help them in thinking out their problems. 

Written and Spoken English. — Clearness and accuracy in speech and 
writing are essential qualities of a good officer and will be insisted upon in 
this course. There will be one or more short written exercises each week 
prepared in the class room or out of it at the discretion of the instructor. 
Each student will be required to keep a note-book and to take brief but 
orderly notes on his lectures and reading. 

Books Required. — The time required for pieparation will be the same as 
for other University courses for which three hours credit is given. For this 
outside study each student will need to secure the following books in ad- 
dition to tliis outline: Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, McKinley, Col- 
lected Materials on the Study of the War; and the following pamphlets: 
The War Cyclopedia, Conquest and Kultur, and Hazen's Government of 
Germany. The total cost will be about four dollars. The topics to be cov- 
ered and the readings assigned are indicated in the following pages of this 
outline. 

War Issues 2. — This is a combination of War Issues 1 with additional 
training in English composition based largely on topics connected with the 
subject matter of the course. In addition to the lecture, there will be three 
discussion meetings, making four hours in all and entitling the student to 
four hours credit. 

BVARTS B. GREENE, 

University (ft Illinois, S«pt. 27. 1918. 



I. GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR. 

1. Certain prominent physical facts. 

a. Rivers, lakes, and mountains: important ciiiefly as natural defenses. 

(1) The Seine river system: a complex of rivers cutting the region 
between Paris and the German frontier (the Marne, the Vesle. 
the Aisne, the Oise, etc.) ; of great importance as obstructions to 
German progress, especially since the Germans took the Belgian 
route. 

(2) The river system of northeastern Italy; note the importance of the 
Piave and neighboring streams in the last Austrian offensive. 

(3) The rivers of western Russia; note their general directions; of 
great importance in the Russian retreat, 1915. 

(4) The Masurian lakes: fatal to the Russian invasion of Prussia, 1914. 

(5) The Alps, the Carpathians, and the Vosges; note that the trench 
lines in the Vosges are only a dozen miles from the Rhine. 

b. Military routes. 

(1) The Tigris valley; the Tigris is also important as a navigable 
stream. 

(2) The Vardar-Morava valley (Balkans) : the route of the Teutonic ad- 
vance through Serbia southward. 

(3) The lower Danube: important in the Teutonic invasion of Ru- 
mania. 

c. Waterways and narrow seas. 

(1) The Dardanelles: note the effect of the closing of these straits 
on Russian participation in the war. 

(2) The Suez Canal. 

(3) Strait of Gibraltar. 

(4) The English Channel: note that the better harbors are on the 
English side of the Channel. 

(5) The Orkney route. 

(6) The entrance to the Baltic. 

d. The North Sea: shallow in places; extensive sandbanks; good chan- 
nels near the German coast rare; Germany practically immune from 
invasion. 

2. Economic factors. -See Collected Materials, 90. 

a. Coal fields of Germany and Austria. 

b. Iron mines of Germany and Austria; note the fact that Germany has 
also had access to the iron products of Sweden. 

c. Oil fields of Galicia, Rumania and the Caucasus. 

d. Wheat fields of Hungary and southern Russia. 

e. The vast mineral wealth and industrial establishments of Great 
Britain. 

f. The phosphates deposits of Alsace; German monopoly of potash. 

3. Advantages and disadvantages of position and location. 

a. Note the fact that Germany occupies a central place in Europe and 
that she has found it comparatively easy to shift men and materials 
from front to front. In this respect the allies have been at a disad- 
vantage; communication across the Channel is easy, but the western 
powers have found it almost impossible to assist Russia or Serbia. 

6 



. Note the tact that England controlB aU the waterways that allow the 
central powers to communicate with the larger world: Suez Canal 
Strait of Gibraltar, the Channel, the Orkney route 
Note that after the Dardanelles and the Danish straits had been 
closed Russia had only two outlets, Archangel and Vladivostok- dis 
tance and climate are important in this case; today all the Russian out 
lets are sealed. 



II. GERMANY BECOMES A WORLD POWER. 1864-1875. 
1. The Unification of Germany. 

a. The causes. 

(1) The hopelessly inefficient organization of the German Confeder- 
ation: a union of princes, not of states. 

(2) The rivalry within the Confederation of Prussia and Austria, both 
claiming leadership. (It is important to note that the aspirations 
of Austria lay largely outside Germany.) 

(3) Bismarck; prime minister; most important man in Prussia; of tre- 
mendous force, unusual abilities and ruthless methods (blood and 
iron); opposed to democracy and popular control of government; 
ambitious to remodel the Confederation and secure the leader- 
ship for autocratic Prussia. 

b. The means: the Prussian army; aggressive warfare. 

(1) 1864. The German states attack Denmark and deprive the Danes 
of Schleswig-Holstein. 

(2) 1866. Prussia and Austria quarrel over the spoils; the Seven 
Weeks' War; Prussia is victorious and annexes Schleswig-Hol- 
stein, also several German states— 4,500,000 new subjects; organ- 
izes Nortla German Confederation (1867). 

Note: these wars secured for Prussia the important naval station 
Kiel and the future site of the Kiel Canal. 

(3) 1870-1871, July to January. The Franco-Prussian War; results: 

(a) France loses her position as first power in Continental Eu- 
rope; becomes a republic. 

(b) The South German states join the North German Confedera- 
tion to form the German Empire. 

(c) In the treaty of Frankfort the Germans take Alsace and Lor- 
raine and exact an indemnity of $1,000,000,000; th* Rhine be- 
comes a German river; the boundary is pushed to the Vosges. 

(d) The problem of Alsace-Lorraine dates from this treaty; it is 
kept alive and vigorous by Prussian efforts at Germanization. 
Note the importance of the iron fields of Lorraine; interesting 
parallels may also be drawn between the plans of campaign 
of 1870 and 1914. 

c. The result: the new German Empire. 

(1) The most populous state in Europe excepting Russia; highly cen- 
tralized in government — organized for efficiency rather than to 
secure civil rights; had developed the most efficient educational 
system in Europe from this point of view. 

(2) Militaristic: had the most efficient army in Europe; the Germans 
had great faith in the Prussian army— it had been victorious in 
three wars and had brought territorial increase and indemnity. 

(3) Autocratic: Prussia controlled, and Prussia was ruled according 
to the ideas of Bismarck. 

H) The first power on the Continent: on terms of friendship with Rus- 
sia and Austria (league of the three Caesars, 1872-1878). 

2. The government of Germany. 

a. Prussia controls; has 236 of 397 members in the Reichstag (lower 
house) ; is able to veto important measures in the Bundesrath (upper 



house) ; king of Prussia is emperor. (The Prussian Landtag, legis- 
lature, is not a representative body; it is chosen and dominated largely 
by the Junkers and the wealthier classes; compare the British House 
of Commons.) 

b. Emperor controls foreign policy; executive officials responsible to 
the emperor; government not in any sense democratic; administration 
not responsible to the legislature. 

c. Oppressive as well as autocratic; treatment of subject races (French- 
men, Danes, Poles) unintelligent and brutal. 

3. Note: the development of self-confidence, arrogance, and chauvinism 
among the Germans is due largely to military success, profits from war, 
and swift rise to power among nations. 

Literature. 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 74-116, 16.3-177. 

*Hazen, Government of Germany (16 pp.). 

*War Cyclopedia; see under "Autocracy," "Alsace-Lorraine," "Bundes- 

rath," "German Constitution," "German Empire," "Kaiserism," "Kiel 

Canal," "Reichstag," "Schleswig-Holstein." 

Notestein and Stoll, Conquest and Kultur (Jan., 1918), 11-41. 

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates required reading. 
Map Study:— McKinley, Collected Materials, 92: growth of Prussia and 

Germany; on the opposite page note the fact that the German language 

area extends southeastward into Austria. 



III. THE BALKAN PROBLEMS TAKE FORM, 1875-1887 

1. Important geographical facts 

a. Constantinople and the straits: gateway of the Black Sea. 

b. Saloniki: most important port on the Aegean Sea; route from Saloniki 
northward along Vardar River. 

c. Macedonia:, most difficult problem in the peninsula, population a com- 
plex of mutually hostile races. 

d. Albania: backward mountain country; Albanians a nation but incap- 
able of self-government. 

2. Conflicting ambitions in the Balkans 

Turkey anxious to maintain her territorial integrity. 

Russia planniBg for an outlet through the straits; this might make the 

control of Constantinople necessary; closing of the straits by Turka 

and Germans in 1914 made it impossible for Russia to hold her own in 

a long war. 
Greece ambitious to annex Greek lands around the Aegean. 
Bulgarians striving for national existence and independence. 
Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro eager for complete independence and 

enlargement of territories. 
Austria hoping to annex Turkish territory to the Aegean: Bosnia, the Vai- 

dar valley, Saloniki. 

3. Revolutionary movements; the Russo-Turkish War 

1875. Revolt in the northwest (Herzegovina) ; the movement spreads. 

1876. The Bulgars rebel; "Bulgarian atrocities." 
1877-1878. Turks defeated in war with Russia. 

1878. Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin. 

4. Congress of Berlin (noted chiefly for failure and error; the present war 
dates from its sessions; its settlement was largely the work of Disraeli 
and Bismarck) : 

a. Failed to put an end to the Turkish regime in Europe; made possible 
the present close connection between Turkey and Germany. 

b. Failed to carry out fully the principles of naUonality: gave independ- 
ence to Serbia and Rumania but left millions of Serbs and Rumanians 
outside the boundaries of these states; did not satisfy the ambitions 
of the Greeks; divided the Bulgarian lands into three parts, leaving 
one part wholly under Turkish rule. 

c. Gave the control of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria; an important 
Austrian advance toward the hetd of tlio Vardar valley. 

d. Failed to deal with the Macedonian problem. 

e. Note: (a) Serajevo is capita! of Bosnia; (b) the "Saloniki front" 
was established largely to prevent Austria from reaching Saloniki. 

f. Compare the territorial arrangements of the treaty of San Stefano with 

the settlement of the Congress of Berlin. 

5. The Triple Alliance and the Dual Eirtente grew out of the settlement at 
Berlin. 

a. Austria got two provinces without taking part in the war; Russia 
gained very Uttle; Bismarck forced to choose between Austria and 
Russia chose to support Austria; Russia angry and humiliated; League 
of the Three Emperors dissolved. 

9 ' 



b. 1879, Austria and Germany form a Dual Alliance. 

c. Prance was encouraged (at Congress of Berlin) to seize Tunis; Italy 
looked on Tunis as her own future possession; disappointed she joined 
the Dual Alliance which now became the Triple Alliance, 1882. 

d. France seeks a friend and ally in Russia: Dual Entente finally formed, 
1893. 

6. Later developments in the Balkans 

1881, Rumania a kingdom; 1882, Serbia a kingdom. 

1885. The two Bulgarias united; 1887; Ferdinand prince of Bulgaria 
(later Tsar). 

Literature. 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 187-223, 246-254, 283-289. 
Hazen, Modern European History, 395-396; 462-463; 540-555. 

*War Cyclopedia; see under "Balkan Problems," "Bosnia-Herzegovina," 
"Bulgaria," "Congress of Berlin," "Constantinople," "Ferdinand I," 
"Macedonia." "Saloniki," "Serajevo." "Serbia," "Triple Alliance." 

Map Study. 

Holt and Chilton, 214: the settlement of 1878. 

Collected Materials, 88: Balkan peninsula; note especially the river val- 
leys; in mountainous countries these form the obvious routes and high- 
ways in times of war as well as of peace; note that the Morava and 
the Vardar valleys form an almost continuous route from the Austrian 
frontier to the Aegean Sea; at present an important railway runs 
southward through these valleys. 



10 



tV. ECONOMIC EXPANSION OF GERMANY: COLONIAL RIVALRIES 

1. Industrial resources: cheap labor; a limited supply of coal and iron. 

2. Industrial needs 

a. Raw materials: cotton, silk, wool, rubber, copper, precious metals, 
minerals, woods, etc. 

b. Markets at home and abroad. 

c. Food supply: at maximum efficiency of agriculture Germany can pro- 
vide food for 50,000,000; but Germany's industrial development has led 
to a decline in agriculture. 

3. Industriaf growth: tremendous development of manufacturing in Saxony 

and the Rhine country (note location of Essen) ; great activity in ship- 
building; steady growth of foreign commerce — almost trebled in 40 
years. 

4. Economic policy: Bismarck 

a. Protective tariff, 1879: to stimulate manufacturing; to close German 
markets to foreigners. 

b. Concessions to foreign traders in order to secure concessions (mark- 
ets) in return. 

c. State socialism to conserve labor: various forms of state insurance 
against unemployment, sickness, old age, etc; 1883-1889. 

d. Colonial expansion: to secure raw materials, markets, and homes for 
surplus population. Bismarck was at first opposed to this policy; ac- 
cepted it about 1883. 

5. "The scramble for Africa," 1880-1890. 

' a. France crosses the Sahara from Algiers and Tunis and takes posses- 
sion of the greater part of Sudan, 
h. England works her way from the Cape northward nearly 2000 miles; 
occupies Egypt 1882; Cecil Rhodes plans Cape to Cairo Railway. 

c. The king of Belgium organizes a state in the Congo valley (1885) ; 
this has since become a Belgian dependency. 

d. Germany takes possession of Togoland, Kamerun, Southwest Africa 
(1884) and German East Africa (1885). 

e. Outcome: Germany secured nearly 800,000 square miles of African 
territory but was not satisfied; note that most of these colonies are 
located near the Equator and therefore not suitable for settlement by 
Germans; the soil in Southwest Africa is not fertile. The plan: ex- 
tensive possessions in the Tropics for exploitation; colonies in temper- 
ate regions for settlement. 

Note: the Allies have seized all the German colonies in Africa and 
elsewhere. 

6. Rivalry with England, 
a. Commercial. 

(1) English merchants at a disadvantage in (Jermany because of the 
high German tariff; English markets open to Germans; English 
irritated; parliament (1887) enacted that all German wares offered 
for sale in the British Isles should be marked "made in Germany." 

11 



(2) England owned half of all the tonnage on the seas; Germans built 
vigorously; but England built more than all the rest of the world, 
Germans irritated. 

(3) German commerce gained steadily on that of England till 1909; 
since then English trade has advanced more rapidly. 

b. Colonial: England has an empire of nearly 13,000,000 square miles, in- 
cluding India, Egypt, Australia, and much more; German writers have 
demanded that England share with Germany. 

Note: England has applied the principle of colonial self-government 
more extensively and thoroughly than any other European country. 

Literature 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 264-279, 295-299, 317-340. 

Hazen, Modern European History, 368-382, 403-408, 499-514. 
*War Cyclopedia; see under "Coal and Iron," "German Colonies," "Ger- 
man Southwest Africa," "Krupp." 
*Conquest and Kultur, 47-51, 71-74. 

Map study 

Collected Materials, 90; maps of coal and iron deposits; note the distriba- 
tion of coal and Iron fields in central Europe, particularly the iron 
regions of Belgium and Lorraine. 

Holt and Chilton, 334: Africa; note the location of the German colonies 
with reference to the Equator; note also that Walfisch Bay and Zanzi- 
bar, the commercial outlets of German Southwest Africa and German 
East Africa respectively, are British possessions. (Germany in 1890 
exchanged her claims to Zanzibar for Heligoland, see Holt and Chilton, 
174, for location of Heligoland.) 



V. THE RIVALRY OF ENGLAND AND GERMANY ON THE HIGH SEAS; 

THE ENTENTES. 

1. 1871-1914; no war in Europe (except in the Balkans), but nearly all the 
great powers armed to the teeth; old hostilities alive underneath the 
armor: armed peace. 

a. Militarism: to maintain huge standing armies, professedly for defense, 
actually for aggressive purposes. In 1914 Germany had the greatest, 
best equipped, and most efficient army in Europe; England alone of 
all the powers had no great military establishment. 

b. "Navalism": Germany has charged England with "navalism," excess- 
ive development of her navy. England tries to maintain a "two-power 
standard:" a navy equal to any other two. The character of the Brit- 
ish Empire is such that large and swift-sailing men-of-war alone can 
hold it together. 

c. A navy is essentially a weapon for defense; militarism is far more 
dangerous than naval development; but a combination of militarism 
and "navalism" is the greatest menace to the world's peace. 

d. The German army is an element of influence in the government; in 
England the military is held to be subordinate to the civil authority; 
the contrast is important. 

2. The development of the German Navy. 

1897. Von Tirpitz becomes secretary of the navy; continues as such to 
1916; policy: (1) to make the German navy so strong that it would be 
dangerous for any nation to attack it; (2) to develop a high seas fleet 

1898. German Navy League formed; to develop sentiment for a great 
navy; 200,000 members in 1900. Naval power increased. 

1900. Further increase in German navy. 

1906. New navy law; rivalry with England grows more intense. 
1908. Navy law: four battle-ships to be built yearly. 
1912. Further increase in ships and men. 

Note: a parallel development of the German merchant marine promoted 
by government subsidies. 

3. Naval Policy of England 

a. To maintain the two-power standard: 1904, Sir John Fisher appointed 
first sea lord; designs the first Dreadnought, ready for action, 1906. 

b. To strengthen fleet in the home waters; this accomplished by series 
of understandings and agreements. 

c. To secure a limitation of armaments: England proposed this in 1906, 
1907, 1909, and 1912; Germany refused to discuss the proposals; Eng- 
land suggested a "naval holiday" for 1913; not acceptable to Germany. 

d. English navy (ships built or in building), 1914, 545; German, 302. 

4. The Ententes 

1900. England realizes failure of policy of "splendid isolation;" she has 
no allies and many enemies; no fleet in the North Sea; Germans build- 
ing a powerful navy. 

1902. Alliance with Japan; English ships brought from the North Pa- 
cific to the North Sea. 

13 



1904. The Entente Cordiale: settlement of all disputes and questions be- 
tween England and France; English ships transferred from the Med- 
iterranean to home waters. 

1907. Understanding with Russia: the Triple Entente. Europe now di- 
vided into two powerful camps, the Triple Entente and the Triple Al- 
liance; latter the more definite and complete. 

Understanding with Spain as to Morocco. 
1918. Effort of Sir Edward Grey to reach an understanding with Ger- 
many; almost successful; Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador, 
favorable. 
5. The question of Morocco: Germany twice challenged France in this 
region, her purpose being in part to test the strength of the entente; 
found it in "perfect working order." 

1905. Kaiser visits Tangier; serious diplomatic crisis; agreement reached 
at Algeciras, 1906. Importance of the entente cordiale. 

1911. A German war ship at Agadir; a warning to France; England 
again supports France; Germany forced to yield. 

1912. Morocco becomes a French protectorate; note that Spain has a 
share of Morocco. 

Literature 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 299-316, 365-387, 456-474. 

Hazen, Modern European History, 406-408. 

*War Cyclopedia; see under "Disarmament," "Dreadnaught," "German 

navy," "Militarism," "Navalism," "Navy," "Prussianism," "Triple 

Entente." 
-Conquest and Kultur, 41-46, 111-124. 

Map study 

Holt and Chilton, 334; Morocco, Agadir, Tangier. The student should 
also be able to locate the chief naval bases of England and Germany: 
Portland. Portsmouth, Dover, Chatham, the Orkneys (Kirkwall); Em- 
den, Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven, Kiel. 



14 



VI. THE PAN-GERMAN MOVEMENT. SINCE 1890. 

The Pan-German League 

a. Founded 1890, reorganized 1893; membership about 50,000; closely as- 
sociated with Navy League; influential with the imperial government; 
strongly supported and strongly opposed. i 

b. Alms. 

(1) To make the German state coterminous with the German- race; 
this would involve addition of several Austrian states, part of 
Switzerland, perhaps parts of Russia. 

(2) To add related Teutonic peoples to the great German state: Hol- 
land, part of Belgium, th« Scandinavian states. 

(3) To extend the power of Germany throughout the world; to force 
England to surrender her best colonies. 

(4) To assist Germans in other lands (United States, Brazil) to main- 
tain Deutschtum: German speech, ideals, and mode of living. (The 
Pan-Germanists have always been hostile to the Monroe Doctrine.) 

The Bagdad Railway scheme 

a. The plan (first developed by Dr. Rohrbach about 1900) : to build a rail- 
way from the Bosporus by way of Bagdad to the Persian Gulf; to con- 
nect this with the railway system from Hamburg and Berlin to Con- 
stantinople; to build a branch line south through Syria and on toward 
Mecca and further. 

b. Future possibilities of the plan. 

(1) To develop Asiatic Turkey, especially the Mesopotamian plain. 

(2) To divert a large part of the trade of eastern and southern Asia to 
this line (half of the world's population lives east of the Persian 
Gulf). 

(3) To seize at some future time the Suez Canal and thus secure con- 
trol of both short routes to the Orient. 

(4) To connect the Syrian branch with the Cape to Cairo Railway and 
divert the trade of East Africa to German ports. 

c. England spoiled the larger features of the plan by raising the Union 
Jack over Koweit, the proposed terminal on the Persian Gulf. (Koweit 
had asked for British protection before the Bagdad plan was com- 
pleted.) 

The Mid-Europe scheme (first fully developed by Naumann, 1915): this 

plan looks toward the formation of a great military and economic union 

of Germany, Austro-Hungary, and the Balkan states; the Bagdad Railway 

scheme fits closely in with the Mid-Europe plan. 

Pan-Germanism as a cause of war 

a. The Pan-Germanists realized that their plans could be carried out only 

through war and welcomed it. 
ta. Their constant agitation for colonial adventures disturbed the peace 

of the world; they helped to bring on the Morocco crisis, 
c. They preached constant hostility to England as the great obstacle to 

the achievement of their plans. 

16 



l.iterature 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 303-304, 531-535. 

*War Cydopedia; "Berlin to Bagdad," "Drang nach Osten," "Mittel EJu- 
ropa," "Pan-Germanism," "Place in the sun." 

*Conquest and KuJtur, 52-66, 75-110, 136-157. 

*The President's Flag Day Address, 7-30 (including foot-notes). 
Map Study: see Collected Materials, pp. 92-93; cf. maps on p. 90 and note 

that the Mid-Europe plan would give the proposed union control of great 

areas of mineral wealth and of the Danubian wheat belt 



lt> 



Vli. THE DECLINE OF RUSSIA 

The Old Russia 

a. Racial situation: 70 languages spoken; population about 70 percent 
Russian. 

(1) The three Russias: Great Russia (central part). White Russia 
(west). Little Russia (southwest). 

Note: Little Russia was in 1918 made into the Republic of Uk- 
raine. The Ukranians speak a dialect somewhat different from 
that of Great Russia. 

(2) A rim of non-Russian peoples along the western border. Finns, 
Lithuanians (and Letts), Poles. 

Note: these have all been surrendered by the Bolsheviki. 

(3) To the east a variety of races, chiefly Turanian. 

(4) Russification: since 1870 a determined effort has been made to 
drive the native languages of the non-Russians from public use 
(in churches, schools, theaters, administration, business) and com- 
pel the use of Russian. 

Note: Russification was chiefly responsible for the doubtful at- 
titude of the Poles in the present war and for the secession of 
Finland, 1817. 

b. Autocratic and bureaucratic in government: country governed by a 
host of officials owing obedience to the Tsar only; no security of civil 
rights. 

c. Medieval in social organization: nobles (highly privileged); oflacial 
classes (privileged); mercantile class; peasants and laborers. The 
land was owned in part by the nobles, in part by peasants organized 
into communities; individual property in peasant land not general. 
Note: the promise of the Bolsheviki to distribute the land of the aristo- 
crats among the peasants was an important factor in the success of 
their revolution, 1917. 

d. Siberia: a vast region thinly populated; settled chiefly by Cossacks, 
convicts, political offenders, oflficials, emigrants, or by descendants of 
such. A broad belt of Russian population to Lake Baikal; a narrow 
strip from Lake Baikal to the Pacific along the Siberian Railway. 

The New Russia 

a. Revolutionary movements: last half century. 

(1) Liberalism: dissatisfaction with autocracy and repression; de- 
mand for a constitution, civil rights, religious freedom, freedom of 
the press; the liberal movement was limited almost entirely to 
aristocrats and intellectuals. 

(2) Nihilism: violent socialists assumed control of the liberal move- 
ment about 1875; revolutionary societies organized but hunted 
down by the police; Nihilists declare war on officialdom — assas- 
sination the chief weapon; Tsar Alexander II assassinated in 1881 
(fourth attempt). 

b. Industrial revolution; especially after 1890. 

(1) Russia adopts the policy of state aid to industry chiefly by means 
of a protective tariff; foreign capital drawn in; loans made largely 
in France; great development of manufacturing; considerable 
building of railways: Siberian Railway, 1891-1902. 

17 



(2) New demand for labor; peasants migrate to the factory towns; 
cities grow in size; dissatisfaction grows among labor. Proletariat 
and rich- middle class grow together. 

(3) Theories of socialism take root in the laboring class; Bolsheviki. 

(4) Ideas of Tolstoi (poverty, communism, non-resistance) receive 
wide acceptance. 

3. An experiment in constitutional government; since 1906 

1904-1905, war with Japan; unpopular; disastrous; revelations of dishon- 
esty and inefficiency; position of autocracy shaken. 

1905, demand for constitutional rule; riots and massacres; strikes. 

1906, First Duma (legislature) meets; quarrels with government — finds 
the Tsar had deprived it of real power; dismissed; failure. 

Later meetings of the Duma also failures. 

4. Situation in Russia, 1914: dissatisfaction to the point of revolt through- 
out Russia, especially among the socialists of the industrial centers; the 
land problem unsettled; the non-Russians in the west strenuously re- 
sisting Russification ; international prestige of the empire shaken by th'e 
outcome of the Russo-Japanese war. 

Literature 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 241-246, 341-354, 363-364, 420-425. 
Hazen, Modern European History, 558-573, 580-582, 585-589. 
*War Cyclopedia, "Bolsheviki," "Finland," "Lenine," "Milyukov," "Nich- 
olas II," "Fan-Slavism," "Poland," "Russia," "Slavs," "Ukraine." 
Map Study: Collected Materials, 20; note that Russia is not abundantly sup- 
plied with coal and iron and that the loss of Finland and Ukraine would 
be a serious blow to Russian industry; note also that Ukraine covers a 
large part of th« great Russian wheat belt. — The map on page 98 shows 
the territory surrendered by the Bolsheviki in the west and southwest; 
it should be observed that these regions were not given to Germany, but 
that Germans hope to organize and control them. 



18 



VIII. THE DISINTEGRATION OF TURKEY; THE BALKAN WARS. 

1908-1913 

The Turkish Revolution, 1908 

a. Character of Turkish rule: autocratic, arbitrary, inefficient, oppressive, 
bloody. 

b. The Young Turk movement: party professedly for a constitutional gov- 
ernment, a humane administration, and liberal institutions of the west- 
em type; brought the army at Saloniki to its view; successful revolu- 
tion; constitution proclaimed; Young Turks seized offices. 

c. Failure of the revolution: Young Turk leaders proved as inefficient 
and blood-thirsty as their predecessors; attempted Ottomanization. 

d. During the revolution (1908) Austria formally annexed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which she had been administering for Turkey, and Bul- 
garia declared herself wholly independent under a Tsar. 

Note: this annexation was of tremendous importance, as the new 
Austrian subjects were largely Serbs; Serbia protested and mobilized 
but found no support. 

The war between Italy and Turkey, 1911. 

a. Italy proceeded to conquer Tripoli, a Turkish dependency. 

b. To hasten the end of the war Italy attacked Turkey in the Aegean Sea 
and occupied twelve islands, including Rhodes. 

c. Turkey surrendered Tripoli to Italy; Italy promised to return the 
islands; has not done so — Italy and Turkey again at war. 

The Balkan wars, 1912-1913. 

a. 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro form alliance against the 
Turks; Venizelos the chief spirit in the league. Allies demand reforms 
in Macedonia; Turks unwilling and begin to mobilize. 

b. October, 1912, the Balkan allies attack Turkey at four points; swift 
and furious fighting for six weeks; the Turk defeated at all points/ 

c. May, 1913, treaty of London; dissatisfaction among the allies; Austria 
insists on an independent Albania — to shut Serbia from the sea. 

d. Second Balkan war: war for Macedonia; Bulgaria against her allies 
and Rumania; Bulgaria crushed. 

e. Treaty of Bucharest, August, 1913. Bulgaria was forced to return 
Adrianople to the Turks, to cede a strip of the Dobrudja to Ru- 
mania, and to leave the larger part of Macedonia to Greece and Serbia. 

General results. 

a. The Triple Alliance was practically dissolved: Italy had attacked a 
friend of the Teutonic powers. 

b. Austria forced Europe two steps in the direction of war: (1) in 1908 
when she formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and angered 
Serbia; (2) when in 1913 she insisted on an independent Albania and 
thus prevented Serbia from securing an outlet on the Adriatic. 

c. Bulgaria became the mortal enemy of Serbia and naturally drifted into 
the Teutonic alliance in 1915. 

d. Only the Central Powers had shown any real interest in Turkey during 
the war; Russia was the ancient enemy, England and France were 

19 



friendly to Russia; consequently closer relations with Germany on the 
part of the Young Turks. 
e. The present war grew directly out of the Balkan wars: Austria had 
been balked by Serbia and Greece: Serbia lay squarely across the 
route to the Aegean; Greece had Saloniki. 

Literature 

♦Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 438-455, 477-503. 
Hazen, Modern European History, 409-415, 555-557, 594-606. 
War Cyclopedia; see under "Austria and Serbia, 1913," "Balkan Wars," 
"Enver Pasha," "Macedonia," "Saloniki," "Turkey," "Young Turks." 

IVIap study. 

A map showing the racial and linguistic situation on the Balkan penin- 
sula will prove very enlightening; a comparison of such a map with the 
boundaries drawn by the treaty of Bucharest will to a large extent ex- 
plain the attitude of the various Balkan states toward the Great War. 



20 



iX. THE EVE OF THE GREAT WAR. 1913 1914. 

Conditions and problems. 

a. The balance of power was, in German opinion, seriously disturbed by 
the outcome in the Balkans: the friends of the Teutonic allies, Turkey 
and Bulgaria, had both been defeated. 

b. The feeling between Austria and Serbia was approaching the breaking 
point: 

(1) Austria had twice blocked the plans of the Serbs: by the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia, and by the creation of an independent Albania. 

(2) Serbia had blocked Austrian plans of future annexations in the 
peninsula by extending her territories into Macedonia along the 
Vardar River. 

(3) Serbians were supporting a strong Pan-Serbian movement in the 
Austrian provinces to the northwest. 

(4) About the time of the treaty of Bucharest Austria was planning 
an attack on Serbia (August, 1913) ; see War Cyclopedia under 
"Austria and Serbia, 1913." 

c. The ancient rivalry and hostile feeling between Austria and Russia 
had become intenssified as a result of the Balkan Wars. 

d. Relations between Russia and Germany were becoming strained: 

(1) Germany had backed Austria in her Balkan ventures in 1908 (Bos- 
nia) and 1913 (Albania) ; Russia was displeased. 

(2) German officers headed by General Eiman von Sanders were sent 
to Constantinople (1913) to reorganize the Turkish army; Russia 
protested against the appointment of von Sanders. 

(3) The Germans feared that Russia would soon proceed against 
Turkey and that her own plans for operations in Asiatic Turkey 
might be upset. 

e. Relations between England and Germany were improving: 

(1) Von Tirpitz appeared disposed to accept a naval ratio of ten to 
sixteen; rivalry passing. 

(2) Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky were negotiating an un- 
derstanding with respect to the Bagdad Railway and German 
operations in the Portuguese possessions in Africa. 

f. A strong peace movement was active in America and parts of Europe. 
Germany prepares for war. 

a. Constant and deliberate efforts made during the winter of 1913-1914 
to stir up the war spirit in the German nation. 

b. Widening and deepening of the Kiel Canal being rushed to com- 
pletion (it was finished July 1, 1914). 

c. By the military law of 1913 the German army was increased from 723,- 
000 to 870,000 men. 

d. Plotting and intriguing going forward in the British possessions, par- 
ticularly in South Africa and India. 

e. Industrial mobilization ordered early in June, 1914 (Sisson Documents). 

f. Unusual military manoeuvres ordered for August, 1914, in the Rhine 
lands; see Collected Materials, 35. 

21 ' 



g. German engiueers completing a great system of strategic railways 
built from the Russian to the French and the Belgian frontier. 

3. Panic in Europe after Germany decides to increase her army: France 
lengthens the term of service; Russia does the same; Belgium introduces 
universal service; powerful movement for preparedness in Sweden. 

4. Murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by Austrian subjects of Serbian 
nationality, memliers of a great Pan-Serbian organization. 

Literature 

*Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, 504-538. 

Hazen, Modet-n European History, 416-426, 590-594. 

*War Cyclopedia: see under "Austria and Serbia, 1913," "Bemhardi," 

"Pan-Germans urge War," "Serajevo." 
Collected Materials, 32-35. 
•Conquest and Kultur, 106 110, 125-131. 
*Prince Lichnowsky, My Mission to London. 



22 



X. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. 

1. A month of preparation, June 28 — July 28. 

June 28. Assassination of the Archduke at Serajevo. 
July 1. Kiel Canal completed; Germany ready for war. 

July 5. Tiie Potsdam Conference. (At this conference which was at- 
tended by ambassadors, high officials, military chiefs, and industrial 
magnates the procedure against Serbia was probably determined upon 
and the European situation canvassed.) 

July 21. Secret orders for German mobilization are said to have been 
sent out on this date; see Collected Materials, 38. 

July 23. Austria sends her ultimatum to Serbia: Serbia ordered to put 
down the Pan-Serbian propaganda and to allow Austria to assist in the 
work; an answer demanded within 48 hours. 

July 25. Serbia replies accepting eight of the ten Austrian demands; a 
ninth is accepted in principle, the participation of Austrian agents in 
the promised investigation of the antecedents of the crime at Serajevo 
is refused as being in violation of the constitution and laws of Serbia. 

July 28. Austria declares war on Serbia, the Great War begins. 

2. The efforts of Grey (England) and Sazonoff (Russia) to avert a general 
war. 

(1) July 26. Grey proposes a conference of the ambassadors of France, 
Germany, and Italy with himself in London to discuss the Serbian ques- 
tion. Germany refuses. July 27. 

(2) July 27. Von Jagow (Germany) suggests negotiations between Russia 
and Austria. Austria refuses. 

(3) July 27. Sazonoff proposes "friendly conversations" with Austria; if 
these should fail he favors Grey's plan. No results. Austria de- 
clares war, July 28. 

(4) July 29. The Tsar proposes a reference of the whole dispute to the 
Hague Tribunal. No results. 

(5) July 29. Grey asks Austria to limit herself to the occupation of Bel- 
grade and adjacent territory — to give time for meditation. No results. 

(6) July 30. Sazonoff (Russia) agrees to stop military preparations if 
Austria will modify her ultimatum to Serbia. German ambassador re- 
plies that Austria cannot do so. 

(7) July 31. Sazonoff promises to maintain a waiting attitude if Austria 
will stay her march and allow the powers to discuss her grievances. 
No reply. 

(8) August 1. Austria announces that she is "ready to discuss her griev- 
ances against Serbia with the other powers." 

(9) Germany had already sent her ultimatums to Russia and France; she 
declared war against Russia in the afternoon (August 1). 

Note: it must be remembered that Russia had long maintained a sort 
of Monroe Doctrine among the Slavic peoples and that Serbia re- 
garded Russia as her protector; an attack on the Serbs could not 
be a matter of indifference to Russia. 



3. Why the Central Powers wanted war. 

a. Austria: to cripple Serbia and promote her own ambitions in the 
Balkans. 

b. Germany: 

(1) To recover her position as first power in Europe which she felt 
she had lost. 

(2) To break up the Triple Entente, or at least render it harmless. 

(3) To promote the Pan-German plans in the Near East. 

4. The plan: a swift march upon Paris while Austria kept the Russians oc- 
cupied; the war was to be short, first victory over France, next the de- 
feat of Russia. The plan failed for two chief reasons: 

a. Belgium refused to participate in the crime against France; her re- 
fusal delayed the march upon Paris and the French were given time 
to prepare. 

b. England entered the war in defense of Belgian neutrality. 
Note with respect to Belgium: 

(1) The neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by the European pov/ers 
including Prussia. 

(2) A state must defend its independence or (if its neutrality is guar- 
anteed) the guarantee becomes void. 

5. The European situation, August, 1914: distinctly favorable to Germany. 

a. The recent strengthening of the military forces in Belgium, France 
and Russia had not yet yielded effective results. 

b. Revolutionary and disintegrating movements were gaining headway in 
Russia. 

c. The socialists in France were in arms against the military law of the 
year before. 

d. England was facing a civil war in Ireland and it was thought likely 
that she would have to deal with revolutionary movements in India 
and South Africa. 

Literature. 

*HoIt and Chilton, History of Europe, 539 579. 

Hazen, Modern European History, 608-618. 

*War Cyclopedia, "Albert I," "Belgium," "Bethmann-Hollweg," "Grey, 
Viscount," "Mobilization Controversy," "Potsdam Conference," "Saz- 
onov," "Sazonov's Efforts to Maintain Peace," "War, Declaration of," 
"War, Responsibility for, in 1914." 
* Conquest and Kultur, 131-135. 



24 



XI. "HOW THE WAR CAME TO AMERICA." 

1. The struggle to maintain our neutrality. 

a. President Wilson proclaimed America a neutral, August 4, 1914; ap- 
pealed for neutrality in sentiment as well as in action; the act was 
generally approved by the nation. 

b. Controversies with belligerent powers. 

(1) With England: the British government set out to prevent the 
neutrals from trading in contraband goods with Germany; this in- 
volved searching ships as they entered or left the North Sea, in- 
terfering with mails, and disorganizing comm.ercial plans; ques- 
tions of vi^hat was contraband also came foi-ward. 

(2) With Germany: the Germans made war on mercantile shipping 
contrary to accepted principles of international law; they tor- 
pedoed our ships and murdered our citizens on the high seas; this 
led to protests and lengthy diplomatic discussions, as in the cases 
of the Lusitania, the Sussex, the Arabic, etc 

(3) The American government and the larger part of the American 
public regarded our controversy with Germany as the more serious 
of the two: in the case of England property rights were involved; 
in the case of Germany the question was one of human lives. 

2. The development of anti-German sentiment. 

(1) Strong pro-German sentiment among certain classes of "hyphenated 
Americans" in the early months of the war; an active minority openly 
for the allies; mass of the population anxious to remain neutral. 

(2) Slow but powerful growth of anti-German sentiment caused by: 

(a) The outrages on the ocean, especially the sinking of the Lusitania. 

(b) The violation of Belgian neutrality and more especially the atroci- 
ous treatment of patriotic Belgians. 

(c) The barbarous methods of German warfare. 

(d) The discovery that America was used as a haven for plotters 
against England in her overseas dominions. 

(e) The discovery that Germany was making war upon us in our own 
country by the destruction of munition plants, stirring up labor 
troubles, etc. 

3. How America was forced to enter the war. 

April 18, 1916. Our government threatens to break diplomatic relations 
with Germany over the Sussex affair; Germany yields but breaks her 
pledge. 

Dec. 18, 1916. President Wilson addresses the belligerents in the interest 

of peace; no results. 
Jan. 22, 1917. President Wilson addresses the Senate on the subject of 

peace in Europe in the light of American ideals and principles; no 

results; Germany was planning more violent warfare. 
Jan.' 31. Germany informs America that submarine warfare in its most 

ruthless form will be resumed; that a million square miles of the ocean 

are closed to the world's trade. 

25 



Feb. 3. Ambassador von Bernstorff dismissed; diplomatic relations with 
Germany broken. 

Feb. 28. The Zimraermann note is published through the associated 
Press. 

March 12. Orders are issued to arm American merchant ships. 
April 2. President Wilson urges the recognition of a state of war with 
Germany. 

April 6. Declaration of wav passed by the House and signed by the Pres- 
ident. 

Dec. 7. War declared against Austro-Hungary. 

4. Why America entered the war. 

a. Because Germany continued in her violation of international law and 
the accepted rules of warfare. 

b. Because Germany was renewing her submarine warfare in a more ruth- 
less form, resulting in the destruction of American ships and the loss 
of American lives. 

c. Because a Prussian victory would endanger the future peace of Ameri- 
ca and make a maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine extremely dlflB- 
cult. 

d. Because a victory for Prussian autocracy and militarism would en- 
danger the future peace of the entire world. 

e. Because the war was taking on the form of a struggle between two 
principles: autocracy and democracy; to permit autocracy to win 
would be to repudiate our own history. 

Literature. 

*War Cyclopedia, "Ancona," "Arabic," "Atrocities," "Belgium" (several 
articles), "Bernstorff" (two articles), "Blacklist," "Blockade," "German 
Intrigue" (and other articles on Germany), "Hyphenated Americans," 
"Kaiserism," "Lusitania," "Mails, British Interference with," "Mercier, 
Cardinal," "Monroe Doctrine, German Attitude," "Neutrality," "Neutral 
Rights," "Peace Terms" (several articles), "Permanent Peace," "Sub- 
marine Warfare" (several articles), "United States" (several articles), 
"War Zone, German," "Why We Are at War" (two articles), "Zimmer- 
mann Note," etc. 

*Col!ected Materials, !}-16 (President Wilson's War Adresses) ; 46-49 

(German War Philosophy). 
*How the War Came to America. 

■The War Message and the Facts behind it. 
Munro, Sellery, and Krey, German War Practices 
Garner, Why we are at War with Germany. 

Map Study: owmg to the importance of the German submarine warfare as 
a factor in our entry into the war, it may be advisable at this point to 
point out the more obvious facts of the geography of this warfare: the 
submarine bases; the routes followed; the location of the more important 
sinkings: the sandbaukp and shallow stretches in the North Sea. etc. 

2€ 



XII. AMERICA AND THE WAR. 

War aims of America. 

a. To restore peace to the world. (This can be accomplished only by the 
defeat of the powers that made the war.) 

b. To secure the future peace of the world. (It should be recalled that 
German leaders are already discussing the advisability of provoking 
another great war; President Wilson hopes to prevent future warfare, 
to some extent at least, by a League of Nations to Preserve Peace.) 

c. To ease the economic burdens of the world and to minimize the likli- 
hood of future collisions by a reduction of armimefats. 

d. To promote the principle of nationality. 

e. To give wider application to the principle of "consent of the governed." 

f. To right the wrong done to France in 1871. 

g. To restore and secure the freedom of the seas. 

h. To liberate the peoples of Europe now held in subjection (Belgians, 
Serbs, and others) and to force restitution by the enemy. 

War preparations of America. 

a. Administrative: the reorganization of our governmental machinery; 
extension of the authority of the executive for war purposes. 

b. Military: the creation of a huge army; the draft; the building of can- 
tonments; the production of munitions and equipi»©i»t; air craft; pro- 
vision for the comforts and intellectual occupation of the soldiers. 

c Naval: expansion of the navy; the building of ships t^ the transport- 
ation of men and materials; the Shipping Board. 

d. £k:onomic 

(1) War taxation and liberty loans. 

(2) Systematic production and conservation of food; the Food Admin- 
istration; the farmer's sliare in the war. 

(3) The conservation of fuel; the Fuel Administration. 

(4) Federal control of transportation and of telegraph service. 
(6) Legislation to promote peace and efficiency in the industries. 

e. Moral: systematic dissemination of information as to the issues of 
the war and our duties and share in the conflict. 

The achieve'ments of America in the. war. 

a. The entry of America into the war restored the courage and confid«ace 
of our Alliea after the dens^oraiization and defection of Russia. 

b. America has succeeded in defining the aims and objects of the Allies 
more sharply than they have beeq, hitherto stated. 

c America has sent an immense army to France which has rendered not- 
able service^ at many points^ and in many important nu>vements. 

d. The Ameci<;an nary has assisted in reducing the danger from the activ- 
ities of the German submarine- 

e. America has lent vast s^ms and shipped immense quantities of food 
to our Allies. 

t America has proved that a democracy can strtke as swift%, as vigor« 
ously, and as effectively as 'aa autocracy., 

27 



Literature. 

*War Cyclopedia, "Aim of United States," "Alien Enemies" (two articles) 
••America" (several articles), "Cantonments" (two articles), "(3om 
mittee on Public Information," "Council of National Defense," "Draft," 
•'Espionage Act," "Food Control Act, Enforcement," "Food," (various 
articles). "Four Minute Men," "League to Enforce Peace," "Navy,' 
"New Na\'y," "President," (two articles), "Red Cross" (several art 
icles), "Ship Corporation," etc. 
♦Collected Materials, 20-25 (President Wilson's Addresses). 
Map Study: there are several possibilities in this week's work. 

a. The student should become acquainted with the location of the various 
centers (cantonments, etc) for the training of the army. 

b. The student should learn the geography of the Western Front, espec- 
ially the location of the American units. 

c. The student should learn where in other parts of the world our men are 
at work: Archangel, Italy, Siberia, etc. 



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